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大家好
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欢迎来到本期解说
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今天咱们要聊点硬核的
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我们要直接深入私募信贷市场的最核心地带
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这期解说主要基于高盛对2026年第一季度
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直接贷款市场的一份全面深度的审查报告
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如果你最近一直在关注私募信贷
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你可能多多少少听过一些
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市场是不是出现裂痕了之类的传闻对吧
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但说实话
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数据呈现出的真实情况远比传闻要复杂得多
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也绝对更引人入胜
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我们将带你揭开信贷质量中
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那些令人非常惊讶的分化现象
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准备好了吗
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咱们直接进入正题
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在咱们一头扎进具体的细节之前呢
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我觉得非常有必要先让大家感受一下这个数字
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5000亿美元
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大家想一想
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咱们今天分析的可绝对不是什么
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随机抽样的小样本
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我们正在审视的是由业务发展公司
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也就是大家常说的BDC持有的
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总价值约5000亿美元的私人贷款
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这意味着什么呢
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这大约占到了整个直接贷款行业
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规模的1/3
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有了这么庞大的数据基础
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可以说咱们今天在这里看到的趋势
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就是当下整个宏观信贷市场最真实
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最清晰的脉搏
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好啦
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那咱们今天怎么拆解这份厚重的报道呢
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一共分五步走
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首先是直接贷款概览
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接着咱们来重点解析一下非应计贷款的上升
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第三步
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看看资产管理人之间那些有意思的巨大分化
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第四步聊聊违约率和pk趋势
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最后展望一下零售基金的资金流出情况
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好咱们先从第一部分开始
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直接贷款概览
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轻微恶化
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分化加剧
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简单总结一下
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高盛2026年第一季度报告的主要宏观发现
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算是给大家先交个底
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首先我们确实看到了信用质量
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比起近期的低点出现了轻微的恶化
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其次非应季贷款
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目前正在向大约2%的历史平均水平
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缓慢靠拢
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第三点
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其实我觉得这可能是最关键的一点
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不同的资产管理人之间表现
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正在拉开巨大的差距
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最后呢资金流向方面正在发生转变
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预计零售端将会出现8~10percent的净流出
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这就是咱们今天的大图景
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脑子里有了这个框架
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咱们再往下看具体指标
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接着咱们来看第二部分
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非营记贷款上升解析
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也是自疫情以来
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市场出现的最大的环比增幅
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那为了确保大家都在同一个频道上
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特别是刚接触私募信贷的朋友
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咱们快速过一下
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定义到底什么是非应计贷款
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说白了就是借款人那边出问题
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停止支付利息了
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导致这笔贷款没法再产生
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一开始说好的那种收益
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你看一旦这些比率开始上升
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就意味着借款人的基本面正承受着不小的压力
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未来能不能把钱全收回来
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就要打个问号了
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也就是为什么
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现在整个市场都在死死盯着这个指标的原因
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你看这张图上的数据
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注意这个特别明显的跳升
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第一季度的行业
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非应季贷款环比直接上升了53个基点
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达到了1.87
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Percent
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说实话
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这确实是自疫情以来的最大环比增幅
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乍一听是不是感觉心里咯噔一下
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觉得有点吓人
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但是咱们退后一步
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客观看待
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即便涨了这么多
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它实际上还是略微低于大约2.0percent
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的历史平均水平
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所以大家要知道
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市场目前经历的其实更像是一种回归常态
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而不是什么全面崩盘
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接下来是第三部分
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非常有意思的一点
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资产管理人的巨大分化
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你会发现并不是所有的基金都在同等的变造
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我们来看看这是怎么引进的
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高盛的数据在这里揭示了一个巨大的分歧
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简直可以说市场处于一种割裂状态
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你看这些公开上市的BDC
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他们的非应季贷款率已经冲到了3.23
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Percent
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明显高于他们2.6percent的历史平均值
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但是你转头去看看
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那些面向零售资金的非上市比DC
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也就是常说的长青基金
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他们的非应季贷款率竟然只有1.26
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Percent
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依然乖乖的待在1.7percent的历史均值下方
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上市和非上市两边完全是冰火两重天
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那大家可能要问了
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为什么会这样呢
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答案其实就三个字
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集中度
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也就是少数几家主要管理人的
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几笔集中的大额贷款
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直接拉高了整个大盘的数据
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报告里非常中立地指出了这一点
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由黑石BX和KKR管理的基金
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在非应季贷款上出现了显著的上升
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但如果我们把黑石和KK2
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这两个巨头的数据单拎出去
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剩下的前20大BDC
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他们的非英居贷款
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其实只稍微上升了28个基点
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仅仅达到1.59克白
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这就直接导致了一个结果
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前20大BDC之间的标准差
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也就是大家业绩的参差程度
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达到了2023年以来的最高点
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这告诉我们什么
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在现在的市场环境下
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选对管理人真的比什么都重要好啦
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看完了有些恶化的一面儿
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咱们换个视角进入第四部分
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违约率与PIK趋势
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来看看市场里的稳定剂都在哪儿
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这就很能说明问题了
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虽然我们刚才一直说非应计贷款在往上走
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但你猜怎么着
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银团贷款市场中的杠杆贷款实际违约率
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截至4月份仅仅只有0.55percent
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大家想想
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相比于1.8percent的历史平均水平
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这个数字真的可以说是微乎其微
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这完美的解释了为什么市场完全没有恐慌情绪
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因为这表明借款人即使手头紧
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面临压力
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但也远远没走到彻底违约躺平的绝境
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他们实际上正在寻找其他的替代方案
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来渡过难关
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而在这其中
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最常见也最好用的替代方案就是PIK了
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全称叫实物支付
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通俗地给没听过的朋友解释一下
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这就像是用更多的新债务
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去支付当前债务的利息
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而不是直接掏出现金
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这是直接贷款领域
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大家很常用的一种灵活性工具
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等于说是给借款人一点喘息的空间
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避免大家撕破脸
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直接走向违约
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那么这个PIK现在用的频繁吗
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令人惊讶的是
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它的使用情况非常稳定
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目前带有PIK选项的贷款
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依然占到未尝BDC贷款的10%
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3.0左右
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基本没怎么动过
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如果咱们按行业来拆解一下
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你会发现医疗保健
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科技和媒体行业的公司是绝对的
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PIK使用大户
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不得不说科技和媒体公司确实是出了名儿
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这喜欢用鲜债来还旧债
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这多少点黑色幽默对吧
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不过有一点值得咱们注意
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这些PIK贷款的按市值计价
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MTM略微下降到了93.5%
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这个意味着什么
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说明市场虽然接受这种做法
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但在对这些资产估值的时候
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心里已经变得更加紧张了
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从这上面
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其实又见证了我们前面提到的那种
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市场分化的主题
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你看数据
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上市BDC的PIK收入
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占了他们总投资收入的7.7%
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而那些非上市BDC的比例呢仅仅只有4.3
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尽管这两类基金在本季度
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对PIK的依赖都有所下降
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但很显然
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上市基金在很大程度上依然更加依赖
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这种纸面上的非现金的利息收入
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最后咱们来到第五部分
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也就是前瞻的部分零售基金资金流出展望
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让我们根据高盛的数据来预测一下
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今年剩下的时间里
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钱都会往哪儿走
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这里的关键点在于
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散户和财富管理渠道的资金
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现在正在大幅度的撤退
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你看这数据
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进入第二季度
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整个行业的资金总流入量
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跟第一季度的火热情况相比
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直接腰斩
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还不止
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降幅超过了60%
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高盛预计
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目前这个领域年化的总流入率
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大概只有可怜的10~12趴了
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可以说是流入的水龙头正在被狠狠的拧紧
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进来的钱少了
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那想出去的钱呢压力反而在剧增
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咱们顺着高盛的思路
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按时间顺序来算一笔账
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第一步
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投资者现在想要拿回钱
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的赎回请求已经飙升到了惊人的50%
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年化率
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大家想跑
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但是第二步
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因为这些长青基金都是带有流动性保护机制的
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他们不可能让你一下子全取走
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所以会把实际允许赎回的额度
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卡死在每年20%
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也就是每个季度最多5%
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那么第三步
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用这惨淡的极少资金流入去抵消掉
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这20%被卡住上限的硬性流出
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高顺就得出了一个结论
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在今年剩下的时间里
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私募信贷的长青产品
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注定要面临每年8~10percent的持续净流出
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当然了
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咱们看报告
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不能只看眼下
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最后一个不容忽视的预警信号
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就藏在各家机构的内部观察名单里
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虽然我们前面说了
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目前的违约率非常低
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但是作为未来压力可能增大的一个领先指标
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报告特意指出
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那些标价低于成本85帕
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但目前还在勉强计息的贷款正在逐渐增加
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在皮鲁J向书记的管理人那里
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表现不如预期的
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贷款余额已经悄悄攀升到了5.4帕
258
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这其实是在提醒大家
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在未来的几个季度里
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非应计贷款可能还会继续慢慢向上爬
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好了总结一下
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今天咱们进行了一次从宏观市场盖帽
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一直深浅到微观贷款指标的深度之旅
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整个数据非常清晰地告诉我们一件事
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私募信贷并没有像外界传言的那样崩溃
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它只是在常态化
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但在这一波常态化的浪潮里
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资产管理人的优胜劣汰正在疯狂加速
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这就给我们留下了一个极其引人深思的问题
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随着信贷趋势不可避免地进一步回归
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历史平均线
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以及不同管理人之间表现差异越来越大
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那些拥有强大机构资本作为后盾的基金
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他们表现出的稳定性
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到底能不能成功压倒零售
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资金流出所带来的剧烈波动性
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这个悬念无疑将直接决定私募信贷市场
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下一章的剧情走向
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大家觉得呢感谢收看本期解说
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咱们下期干货再见